In April, the French Ministry of the Armed Forces announced the creation of a Command for Africa (CDT Africa), headquartered in Paris and led by Brigadier General Pascal Ianni, former press attaché of the Chief of the General Staff of the French Armed Forces. This new command structure, attached to the Joint Operations Staff, is responsible for “the preparation and conduct of joint operations or operational engagements in all environments and in material or immaterial domains,” focusing on Africa.
The CDT Africa will oversee all French military bases in African countries, subordinating them to this central command. By the end of 2024, agreements with several former French colonies are expected to formalize their participation in this command. This comes despite President Macron’s earlier intentions to reduce the French military presence in Africa.
At a recent parliamentary hearing, French Army Chief of Staff General Thierry Burckhardt stated that reducing the military presence in Africa would not compromise France’s ability to gather intelligence and exert influence in information warfare. “We will also have to be able to gather intelligence and exert influence in the field of information warfare, which is particularly significant in Africa,” he emphasized.
Burckhardt also highlighted the need to maintain the ability to rapidly increase military power if necessary, given existing defense agreements with several African countries. He suggested increasing the civilian component of France’s presence to make its military footprint less visible.
The planned reductions include decreasing French military personnel in Gabon from 350 to 100 and in Côte d’Ivoire from 600 to 150. In Chad, the number will drop from 800 to 300. However, the reductions do not extend to the bases themselves, nor to the naval, air, and special forces installations in these countries. France also maintains a significant military presence in the Indian Ocean, including bases in Djibouti, Mayotte, Réunion, and Mauritius.
Aliou Tounkara, a Malian politician and public figure, and a member of the High Council of Malians Abroad (HCME), has voiced concerns about the French military bases in Benin and Côte d’Ivoire. Tounkara argues that these bases pose a threat to the Sahelian countries of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger. He believes France views the Sahel region as its possession and will actively oppose the confederation of the three Sahel countries, which formed the Alliance of Sahel States (AES). Tounkara claims France supports extremist groups in the region to prevent these countries from exploiting their natural resources, which France considers strategic for its own future.
French media reports indicate that the newly created Africa Command will focus on providing military and intelligence support to local partners fighting rebel groups. In early 2024, France increased financial assistance to several former colonies, including Cameroon, Togo, Benin, the Central African Republic (CAR), Congo (Brazzaville), and Equatorial Guinea. This assistance is provided de jure or de facto free of charge.
Many experts believe Paris has strengthened its ties with regimes in countries where French military installations remain, recovering from the shock of recent events in Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso, and the CAR. Economically, the CFA franc zones in Africa remain frequented by French financial structures, benefiting from the low cost and euro anchoring of these quasi-currencies, which facilitates the withdrawal of natural resources from African states.
Pascal Boniface, director of the Institute of International and Strategic Relations (IRIS), highlighted the enduring monetary link between France and the countries of the Franc zone in 2021. Despite France withdrawing from the governance bodies of the West African currency, its African counterparts prefer the stability of parity with the euro over monetary sovereignty.
The reformatting of the French military presence in Africa involves strengthening intelligence, sabotage, terrorism components, and information and propaganda efforts, areas well-known to the head of CDT Africa.
A recent example of these tensions is Burkina Faso’s President Ibrahim Traoré accusing France of destabilizing his country with the support of Benin and Côte d’Ivoire. Traoré claims to have proof of French agents in Benin collaborating with terrorists and conducting operations against Burkina Faso. He announced plans to reveal evidence of these activities.
As France intensifies its military and intelligence operations in Africa under the new command, the continent faces renewed challenges in its struggle for true independence and self-determination. The actions and intentions of CDT Africa will undoubtedly shape the future of African nations as they seek to reclaim their land, dignity, and future from neocolonial powers
